An energy-efficient and scalable slot-based privacy homomorphic encryption scheme for WSN-integrated networks by Verma, Suraj et al.
 The University of Bradford Institutional 
Repository 
http://bradscholars.brad.ac.uk 
This work is made available online in accordance with publisher policies. Please refer to the 
repository record for this item and our Policy Document available from the repository home 
page for further information. 
To see the final version of this work please visit the publisher’s website. Access to the 
published online version may require a subscription. 
Link to publisher’s version: http://airccse.org/journal/ijassn/current2015.html 
Citation: Verma S, Pillai P and Hu Y-F (2015) An energy-efficient and scalable slot-based privacy 
homomorphic encryption scheme for WSN-integrated networks. International Journal of Advanced 
Smart Sensor Network Systems. 5(1): 1-22. 
Copyright statement: © 2015 The authors. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons 
Attribution Licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/) 
 
 
AN ENERGY-EFFICIENT AND SCALABLE SLOT-
BASED PRIVACY HOMOMORPHIC ENCRYPTION 
SCHEME FOR WSN-INTEGRATED NETWORKS 
Suraj Verma*, Prashant Pillai and Yim Fun Hu 
Faculty of Engineering and Informatics, University of Bradford, Bradford, United 
Kingdom 
s.verma4, p.pillai, y.f.hu@bradford.ac.uk 
ABSTRACT 
With the advent of Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN) and its immense popularity in a wide range of 
applications, security has been a major concern for these resource-constraint systems. Alongside 
security, WSNs are currently being integrated with existing technologies such as the Internet, satellite, 
Wi-Max, Wi-Fi, etc. in order to transmit data over long distances and hand-over network load to more 
powerful devices. With the focus currently being on the integration of WSNs with existing technologies, 
security becomes a major concern. The main security requirement for WSN-integrated networks is 
providing end-to-end security along with the implementation of in-processing techniques of data 
aggregation. This can be achieved with the implementation of Homomorphic encryption schemes which 
prove to be computationally inexpensive since they have considerable overheads. This paper addresses 
the ID-issue of the commonly used Castelluccia Mykletun Tsudik (CMT) [12] homomorphic scheme by 
proposing an ID slotting mechanism which carries information pertaining to the security keys responsible 
for the encryption of individual sensor data. The proposed scheme proves to be 93.5% lighter in terms of 
induced overheads and 11.86% more energy efficient along with providing efficient WSN scalability 
compared to the existing scheme. The paper provides analytical results comparing the proposed scheme 
with the existing scheme thus justifying that the modification to the existing scheme can prove highly 
efficient for resource-constrained WSNs. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) have gained immense popularity in the fields of remote 
monitoring due to their low-cost and low-power consumption nature [1]. Their primary function 
is to obtain sensor readings which can then be processed and transmitted across the network. In 
most cases, WSNs are working in cohesion with other communication technologies such as the 
Internet [2], IoT [3], Wi-Fi [4], RFID [5], satellites [6], etc. This is mainly due to the resource-
constraint nature of WSNs and their short communication range (10m-100m) whereby WSNs 
depend on backbone networks to either share the resources or transport data over long distances. 
Most commonly WSNs are integrated with the Internet in order to transform sensor data packets 
into IP packets and transport them over the Internet to the end-user. Apart from the integration 
challenges such as packet transformation and protocol adaptation, there are several security 
challenges that arise when resource-constrained devices such as WSNs are integrated with 
resource-rich networks such as the Internet. One of the main security challenges that arise with 
the implementation of in-processing techniques of data aggregation is the failure of providing 
end-to-end data confidentiality and data aggregation [7] of multi-sensor data [8] which is a vital 
security requirement in WSN-integrated networks. Traditionally when data aggregation is 
implemented in WSNs the sensor nodes transmit encrypted data to their cluster head nodes or 
intermediate nodes which then decrypts the data, performs data aggregation over the plaintext 
sensor data and then re-encrypts the aggregated plaintext data prior to transmission towards the 
next node. This gives rise to hop-by-hop security which consumes more energy for every 
decryption/encryption and also induces a delay for the additional processing, all of which prove 
expensive for WSNs in terms of resources. Apart from the added security feature of end-to-end 
data confidentiality, end-to-end security mechanisms remove the need for additional utilization 
of resources thereby proving to be more efficient compared to hop-by-hop security [9]. 
However, implementing data aggregation along with traditional end-to-end data confidentiality 
mechanisms is impossible since the data aggregation algorithm on the cluster head node or 
intermediate nodes would require access to the plaintext sensor data in order to aggregate the 
sensor data [10]. Research in this aspect has led to the design and development of a special 
category of encryption schemes called Privacy Homomorphic (PH) encryption schemes which 
ensure that end-to-end data confidentiality along with the implementation of data aggregation 
can be achieved [11].  
A PH encryption scheme is an encryption transformation which allows direct computation over 
ciphertext data. For instance, let Q denote a modulus ring and + denotes the addition operations 
on the ring; if K is the key space and  and  then 
 is termed as additively homomorphic with a single secret key 
k and  as additively homomorphic with k1 and k2 as the 
multiple secret keys [10]. Apart from the primary benefit of data aggregation and end-to-end 
data confidentiality, PH schemes have other benefits when implemented in WSNs, such as: the 
knowledge of encryption keys at intermediate nodes are not required since there are no 
intermediate decryptions of the ciphertext; the overall energy consumption of the network 
components and the induced latency can be reduced since there is no need for intermediate 
decryptions/encryptions. While most of the PH schemes presented in literature prove to be 
expensive for resource-constraint WSNs, there are certain low-power algorithms presented in 
[10] that may be used in WSNs. Out of all the schemes proposed in [10], the Castelluccia-
Mykletun-Tsudik (CMT) [12] scheme is chosen due to its low computational costs and 
simplicity which proves efficient for resource-constraint WSNs. However, despite the low 
computational costs and simplicity, the CMT scheme has the ID-issue which increases the 
overhead when the number of responding sensor nodes increase. This is mainly because the IDs 
of individual sensor nodes that participate in the data aggregation process are appended to the 
aggregated ciphertext during each transmission towards the end-user thereby increasing the 
bandwidth and energy consumption. This paper proposes a modified version of the original 
CMT scheme in order to counter the ID-issue faced by the scheme and ensure that the proposed 
scheme is more energy and bandwidth efficient for large scale WSNs. The proposed scheme is a 
slot-based CMT scheme (SCMT) which transmits information pertaining to the security keys 
used during encryption in order to use the corresponding security keys for decryption such that 
the correct aggregated plaintext data is retrieved from the aggregated ciphertext data. This paper 
explains the working principle of the proposed SCMT scheme and through a simulation based 
performance evaluation proves that the SCMT scheme is more efficient than the original CMT 
scheme in terms of packet overhead induced and energy consumed which proves to be suitable 
for scalable resource-constrained WSNs. 
The remainder of this paper is as follows: Section 2 introduces the CMT algorithm and methods 
proposed by other authors to reduce the bandwidth consumption. Section 3 briefly highlights the 
security requirements along with the network architecture of the WSN-satellite integrated 
network. Section 4 presents the working of the proposed SCMT scheme and the initial setup 
phases prior to data transmission. Section 5 presents the analysis of the SCMT scheme in 
comparison to the original CMT scheme in order to prove the efficiency in terms of energy and 
induced overhead. Section 6 presents the future work and concludes the paper. 
2. RELATED WORK 
There are several Privacy Homomorphic (PH) encryption schemes that have been proposed for 
WSNs wherein their performances have been measured with respect to different metrics [10] 
[13]. PH schemes can be broadly classified into asymmetric [14] and symmetric PH schemes. 
This paper mainly focuses on the symmetric PH schemes due to their low computational 
expense which proves to be suitable for resource-constrained networks and their computational 
delay which is several orders of magnitude lower as compared to asymmetric PH schemes [5]. 
The following subsections provide a brief overview of the existing symmetric PH schemes. 
2.1. Castelluccia Mykletun Tsudik Privacy Homomorphic Scheme (CMT) 
The authors of [12] present an additively homomorphic stream cipher scheme known here as 
the CMT scheme, that allows data aggregation and end-to-end data confidentiality. The main 
advantage of this scheme is that it uses modular arithmetic with very small moduli making this 
highly suitable for resource-constrained WSNs. The scheme can be used to compute several 
calculations such as mean, variance and standard deviation of sensor data along with achieving 
a significant bandwidth gain. Each node is assumed to be an aggregator node which forwards 
aggregated data towards the sink node. The main concept behind the scheme is that the xor 
operation of the traditional stream cipher is replaced by the modular addition   operation. The 
keystream k can be generated by using a stream cipher, such as RC4, keyed with the node’s 
secret key si and a unique message ID. This secret key is pre-computed and shared between the 
node and the sink. The message ID can either be included in the query from the sink or it can be 
derived from the time period in which the node is sending its value (assuming some form of 
synchronization). The compromise of an aggregator node by an adversary will not reveal any 
secret information since the plaintext data is not available at the aggregator node and hence the 
system proves to be more secure compared to the hop-by-hop encryption. However, a drawback 
of the proposed scheme is that the identities of non-responding nodes or responding nodes need 
to be sent along with the aggregated data value to the sink node which significantly increases 
the overhead costs. Another important drawback in terms of a potential attack is that the 
encryption transformation is malleable, i.e. an attacker can modify the content of the ciphertext 
into another known form of plaintext without knowing the plaintext or the secret key. . 
CaMyTs Algorithm [12] 
Parameter: Select a large integer M such that )]*([log22 ntM   where t = max_sensor_value and n 
is the   number of sensor nodes 
Encryption: If the message is ]1,0[  Mm  and a random keystream is ]1,0[  Mk  then the 
ciphertext Mkmc mod)(   
Decryption: MkcMkcDec mod)(),,(   
Aggregation: Let the ciphertexts be ),,( 111 MkmEncc   and ),,( 222 MkmEncc   for K = k1 + k2 
then 2121 ),,( mmMkccDec  . 
2.1.1. ID-Issue of the CMT Scheme  
In order for the receiver to compute the aggregated plaintext data from the aggregated ciphertext 
data, the receiver should be able to determine the keysum value K which is the summation of all 
the security keys used during the secure data aggregation process at the cluster head node or 
intermediate nodes. The original CMT scheme transmits the nodes IDs (16-bit or 64-bit source 
addresses) along with the aggregated ciphertext value such that the receiver node can determine 
which security keys it needs to consider in order to calculate the keysum K. This proves to be 
expensive in terms of bandwidth consumption and induced packet overhead since as the number 
of responding sensor nodes increases the payload which contains the IDs also increases in size. 
Further increase in the number of responding sensor nodes leads to an increase in the number of 
data transmissions since the MAC frame of the IEEE 802.15.4 is limited to only 127 Bytes 
leaving a payload of around 100 Bytes in length. This is termed as the ID-issue which is being 
addressed in this paper with respect to reducing the induced packet overhead and number of 
transmissions leading to conservation of valuable WSN energy and bandwidth. 
2.2. Domingo-Ferrer Privacy Homomorphic Scheme (DF) 
The author of [15] introduced a symmetric probabilistic PH scheme wherein addition, 
subtraction, multiplication and division can be performed on ciphertext. The proposed 
homomorphism scheme was the first one to allow full arithmetic operations while being secure 
against the known-ciphertext attacks which requires that the ciphertext splitting is always used 
when encrypting with a splitting factor  and the ciphertext space is much larger than the 
plaintext space. The DF algorithm uses a single symmetric key in every sensor node to encrypt 
the sensor data wherein the aggregator performs aggregation on the ciphertext and the end node 
decrypts the result using the same secret key. Thus, there is no need of appending the node IDs 
along with the ciphertext. However, this reduces the level of security despite the implementation 
of probabilistic encryption (randomness introduced during encryption) since the physical 
compromise of a single sensor node can disclose the secret key in use and induce several 
security attacks on the whole network. However, in the CMT scheme if a single sensor is 
physically compromised only a single security key is compromised and the decryption of the 
aggregated ciphertext is not possible with only a single security key since multiple security keys 
are used. The authors of [16] showed that with reasonable parameters the DF algorithm can be 
implemented in resource constrained devices. It is seen in [16] that value of d ranging from 2 to 
4 proves to be beneficial for WSNs wherein the power consumption of the transmitting sensor 
nodes increases linearly with packet size. 
2.3. Hybrid PH Scheme 
The authors of [17] evaluate three homomorphic algorithms suitable for WSNs and propose two 
approaches to mitigate the weaknesses of the algorithms in terms of the potential attacks and 
low security level. The first approach is the successful combination of two algorithms (DF and 
CMT) which increases the security and the minimization of additional efforts by the careful 
selection of parameters such as the splitting factor. The second approach tackles specific 
weaknesses by considering homomorphic message authentication codes and also describes in 
detail the ID-issue of the CMT scheme. The authors of [17] integrate the CMT algorithm with 
the Concealed Data Aggregation (CDA) algorithm which is the DF scheme in order to create a 
cascading encryption such that 
))(())(())(( 121212 baEEbEEaEE  . The inner encryption 
function is CMT which suffers from the ID-issue and its malleable nature. However, the 
malleability can be countered by the implementation of an outer encryption transformation such 
as the DF, where the knowledge of the secret key is needed to modify the content of a single 
data packet. The advantage of this combination is that the aggregation requires exactly the same 
computational effort as the standalone DF. In order to counter the ID-issue of CMT scheme the 
authors of [17] applied the expression in Eq. 1, to determine the minimum number of bits 
required for reporting e randomly distributed nodes out of n sensor nodes. It was seen that this 
hybrid scheme of DF and CMT proves to be 5 times more efficient in terms of bandwidth gain. 
However, this hybrid scheme is not scalable to large number of sensor nodes as the further 
increase of responding nodes e increases the bandwidth utilization. The proposed scheme proves 
to be more efficient compared to the hybrid scheme and will be justified analytically in later 
sections.  
 
(Eq. 1) 
3. Network Architecture and Security Requirements 
The overall network is an integration of terrestrial wireless sensor networks and the backbone 
network along with IP capabilities on the network components. The proposed network 
architecture can be divided into three sub-networks; namely the terrestrial WSN, the backbone 
network, and the integrating gateway. A remote monitoring station (RMS) is situated at the end 
of the integrated network which acts as the receiving end and the network controller. The 
primary role of the gateway component is to bridge the communication between the WSN and 
the backbone network. In this case the backbone network is considered as the Internet and the 
gateway is mainly responsible for transporting IP-based sensor data over the Internet to the 
RMS. The architecture of the gateway node for the integration with the backbone network is 
beyond the scope of this paper and it is assumed that the gateway is able to transform data 
received by the CH nodes into IP data wherein the entire data packet of the CH node acts as the 
IP payload in the IP data packet. The overall network architecture is as shown in Fig. 1 wherein 
the various network components are highlighted along with the expected flow of data within the 
integrated network. 
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Figure 1. Overall network architecture of the WSN-satellite integrated network used for analysis 
Typically, the WSN consists of several wireless sensor nodes which are deployed within the 
sensing region in a star topology cluster-based node layout scheme [18], as shown in Fig. 1, 
wherein the sensing region is divided into multiple clusters and each Sensor Node (SN) within 
the cluster is randomly distributed within the transmission range of the Cluster Head (CH) node. 
This proves to be more efficient than a non-cluster based node layout scheme where all the 
sensor nodes are randomly deployed within the sensing region and directly communicate with 
the gateway node, since the overall load is being evenly distributed among various clusters 
thereby increasing the operating lifetime of the network components within the WSN [13]. 
The SNs are responsible for encrypting the sensor data prior to data transmission towards the 
CH nodes which are mainly responsible for the in-processing technique of data aggregation. It is 
important to note that there are no intermediate decryptions at the CH nodes or any other nodes 
and that the CH nodes perform data aggregation over ciphertext sensor data. The primary 
security requirements of the integrated network considered in this paper include data 
confidentiality and data integrity. Data confidentiality is achieved with the implementation of a 
symmetric homomorphic encryption scheme whereas data integrity can be achieved with the 
implementation of a Message Authentication Code (MAC) of the ciphertext sensor data. The 
secondary security requirements within the integrated network include counter against replay 
attacks and traffic analysis which can be achieved by appending a frame counter or sequence 
number for data freshness and header encryption to avoid traffic analysis. 
4. Proposed Slot-based CMT Scheme (SCMT) 
This section presents the proposed energy-efficient additive privacy homomorphic encryption 
scheme which is highly scalable in WSNs for multi-sensor data. The proposed slot-based CMT 
(SCMT) scheme mainly implements a slotting algorithm in order to counter the ID-issue of the 
homomorphic encryption scheme proposed in [12]. Table 1 shows the notations used to describe 
the proposed scheme. 
Table 1. Notations and symbols used 
SN Sensor Node 
CH Cluster Head 
KCEKj 
Common shared secret key between all SNs and their CH 
node used during the node registration process 
KCEKj,RMS Individual secret key between the CH node and the RMS 
j Index of the CH node 
IDCH & IDSN Source address of the CH node and the SN respectively 
tokenCH & 
tokenSN 
Security token generated by the CH node and the SN 
respectively using the SHA-1 hashing function 
SeqCH & SeqSN 
Sequence number generated by the CH node and the SN 
respectively for data freshness 
REQtype & 
REStype 
Type of request and response respectively 
DataSN Type of data transmitted by the SN 
L Length of the ID-slot 
K Keysum generated at the RMS used for decryption 
ki Encryption key used at individual ith SN 
Treg Time interval for the node registration process 
The scheme mainly consists of the one-time initialization phase followed by the periodic, 
continuous or event-driven sensor data transmission phase. The initialization phase consists of 
the following processes; node registration process, ID slot generation and transmission process, 
and the generation of the Key-ID table process. During the node registration process the 
individual CH nodes communicate with the SNs within the transmission range of the CH nodes 
in order to create the cluster and create an ID-table of all the SNs within the cluster at the CH 
node. The communication between the CH nodes and the SNs during the node registration 
process is encrypted using the common shared secret key KCEKj between all SNs and the CH 
node where j represents the index for the respective CH node. The node registration process is 
followed by the ID-slot generation and transmission process wherein the proposed slotting 
scheme is mainly operational. The ID-slots are generated at the CH nodes using the ID-table 
generated during the node registration process and the generated ID-slots for the respective 
clusters for different types of sensor data (temperature, humidity, pressure, etc) are transmitted 
to the RMS via the gateway node. The data exchanged between the CH nodes and the RMS 
node is encrypted using the individual shared secret key KCEKj,RMS between the individual CH 
node and the RMS where j is the index of the respective CH node. The final process of the 
initialization phase prior to sensor data transmission is the generation of the Key-ID table 
process wherein the RMS receives the ID information pertaining to the IDs of the SNs and the 
individual cluster ID-slots for different sensor data types which are then used to generate a Key-
ID table. This Key-ID table plays a crucial role in the decryption function of the proposed 
SCMT scheme and is vital prior to any sensor data transmission. After the execution of the 3 
processes of the initialization phase is successfully completed the transmission of encrypted 
sensor data from the SNs towards the RMS takes place. During this data transmission, the 
individual encryption keys of the SNs are used for encrypting the sensor data. The same keys 
are maintained at the RMS for the decryption of the sensor data thereby providing end-to-end 
data confidentiality. The generation and distribution of the encryption keys are beyond the scope 
of this paper and it is assumed that all network entities are aware of the security keys. The 
message exchanges between all network entities during the initialisation phase and data 
transmission can be summarized in Fig. 2. 
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Figure 2. Summary of the Initial Setup Phases of the Proposed Scheme 
4.1. Node Registration Process 
The node registration phase is mainly responsible for the registration of all SNs within the 
individual clusters in order to generate their respective ID tables at the CH nodes. The node 
registration phase mainly consists of the following steps:  
 Each CH node broadcasts a join_request message to all the SNs within its cluster 
encrypted using the pre-shared common encryption key KCEKj which is shared between 
all SNs and their CH node. The join_request message between the CH node and the SN 
is encrypted in order to prevent eavesdropping and traffic analysis attacks. 
 
 The sequence number is a monotonically increasing counter value which corresponds to 
a particular join_request message thereby preventing an attacker from transmitting old 
join_request messages. The security token is used by the SNs to authenticate the CH 
node. It is generated using the SHA-1 cryptographic hash function with {IDCH, SeqCH, 
KCEKj} as the input parameters. 
 The individual SNs receive the encrypted join_request message and decrypt the 
message using the security key KCEKj. The first step is to verify the sequence number 
of the join_request in order to determine data freshness. The second step is to ensure 
data integrity by checking if the security token transmitted is the same as the security 
token generated at the SN using the input parameters {IDCH, SeqCH, KCEKj} obtained 
from the decrypted join_request message. If the integrity check fails at the individual 
SN then the corresponding SN will not register the CH node as its cluster head. 
 After the respective checks at the individual SNs, they generate and transmit a 
join_response message encrypted with the same security key KCEKj, thus preventing 
eavesdropping and message modification of the join_responses which can lead to the 
generation of incorrect ID-slots at the CH node. The sequence number is the same as the 
sequence number of the corresponding join_request message and the security token is 
generated using {IDCH, SeqCH, IDSN, KCEKj} as the input parameters. 
 
 Upon reception of the individual join_response messages from the SNs, the CH node 
verifies if the sequence number of the join_response message is the same as the 
corresponding join_request message in order to ensure data freshness. The CH node 
then proceeds to authenticate the individual SNs by verifying if their transmitted 
security token in the join_response messages are the same as the security tokens 
generated by the CH node using the corresponding SHA-1 cryptographic hash function 
with {IDCH, SeqCH, IDSN, KCEKj} as the input parameters. 
 Upon completion of the two verification processes at the CH node it successfully 
registers the SNs and proceeds with the next process of ID-slot generation and 
transmission. 
4.2. ID-slot Generation and Transmission Process 
This phase is mainly responsible for the generation of the ID-slot which is the novelty of the 
proposed scheme that addresses the ID-issues of the original CMT scheme in [12]. The ID-slot 
with respect to the proposed SCMT scheme can be defined as a bit-field that contains 
information pertaining to the status of the decryption keys used for the respective SN IDs. Each 
bit-field represents the security-key status of an individual SN where a 1 represents that the 
security-key of the respective SN was used during the aggregation function of ciphertexts and a 
0 represents that the security-key of the respective SN was not used. Upon analysing this ID-slot 
the RMS can calculate the required keysum K in order to decrypt the aggregated ciphertext data. 
It is important to note that the ID-slot generation occurs before the elapse of a certain time 
interval Treg, which is the time required for every SN within the cluster to successfully register 
with its CH node after the broadcast of the join_request message. The ID-slot generation phase 
mainly consists of the following steps: 
 Once an individual SN has been successfully verified within the time period Treg, the ID 
of the SN is retrieved from the join_response message and stored in the ID-table 
wherein the index of the ID-table forms the ID-slot for a particular sensor data type, as 
shown in Figure 3. 
 When a SN is successfully verified, the ID of the SN is updated into the ID-table 
followed by the index of the ID-table, x, where the value of x, i.e. 1 or 0 can be used to 
denote if the security key of the corresponding SN ID was used during the aggregation 
process in order to generate the aggregated ciphertext data. The length of the ID-slot is 
denoted by L which is directly proportional to the number of operational SNs within a 
cluster. For instance, within the time interval of Treg, if there are 64 temperature sensor 
nodes that have been successfully registered then the corresponding ID-slot generated 
for temperature data will be a 64-bit field where each bit (starting from the LSB) 
represents the state of the corresponding SN IDs. 
 The ID-slot is constantly being generated until the lapse of Treg, wherein the ID-slot is 
finalized and transmitted in the form of an ID_info to the gateway node. It is important 
to note that the transmission of the respective sensor node IDs is a onetime process in 
order to ensure that all the network components are aware of the participating nodes and 
the structure of the corresponding ID-slots. In order to protect the ID-slot and the other 
slot information from eavesdropping and message modification, the ID_info is 
encrypted using the shared secret key KCEKj,RMS between the CH node and the RMS. 
 
 The ID_info is then forwarded to the RMS via the gateway node over the backbone 
network. The gateway node does not access the slotting information or update the ID-
slot information during the initialisation phase. 
4.3. Generation of Key-ID Table 
The primary function of the RMS is to decrypt the aggregated ciphertext data that it receives 
over the Internet. In order to do this, the RMS must be aware of the security keys used by the 
individual SNs along with which SNs participated in the aggregation function at the cluster head 
in order to generate the aggregated ciphertext data. For this, the RMS maintains a Key-ID table 
of the sensor node IDs within each cluster and their respective security keys. The procedure for 
generation of this Key-ID table is as follows: 
 Upon reception of the ID_info forwarded from the GW node to the RMS over the 
Internet, the RMS decrypts the ID_info using the security key KCEKj,RMS, which is a 
pre-shared key between the individual jth CH node and the RMS, in order to retrieve the 
SN IDs and the corresponding ID-slot for the respective sensor data type. This 
information is used to create the Key-ID table as shown in Figure 4. 
 The sensor node IDs from the ID_info are mapped accordingly with the respective 
security keys of the SN IDs under the ID-slot. The ID-slot, retrieved from the slot 
length L, is created as a blank slot and used as an index for the Key-ID table. 
 Typically, the RMS will access the ID-slot in order to retrieve the length of the ID-slot 
and determine the total number of SN IDs in the ID_info received from the GW node. 
The RMS will then use a look-up table of wireless sensor node IDs mapped with their 
respective security keys in order to map the ID-slot and the security keys wherein the 
ID-slot will be used as an index to determine which SNs were responsible for the 
generation of the aggregated ciphertext data. 
 It is important to note that the order in which the SN IDs are arranged in the ID-table of 
the CH node is retained at the RMS such that the order of SN IDs is the same. The only 
inclusion in the Key-ID table is the respective security keys of the SNs. Upon the 
successful completion of the Key-ID table generation, the RMS transmits an 
ID_response message acknowledging that the ID-slot formats have been successfully 
mapped with the security keys and that the RMS is ready to accept aggregated 
ciphertext data. 
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Figure 4. Key-ID table generation at the RMS node  
2.9. Data Transmission Phase 
The data transmission phase is operational only after the successful completion of the 
initialisation phases such that the ID tables at the CH node and the RMS are successfully 
generated for each cluster. Once the initialisation phase is complete the CH node broadcasts a 
Clear to Send (CTS) signal to all its SNs. During the data transmission phase the individual 
sensor nodes encrypt the sensor data with their respective encryption key ki and forward the 
encrypted sensor data to its CH node. The CH node then performs data aggregation over the 
ciphertext data received from several SNs within the cluster followed up the updating of the ID-
slots. Based on the source address of the transmitting SNs (ID) the CH node is able to update 
the ID-slot indicating that the respective SN was responsible for transmitting an encrypted 
sensor data that was used during the aggregation function. Once the aggregation time period has 
elapsed the CH node transmits the aggregated ciphertext data along with updated ID-slot to the 
RMS via the gateway node. Upon reception of the aggregated ciphertext data, the RMS analyses 
the ID-slot to retrieve information about the security keys it needs to use in order to calculate 
the keysum K used for the decryption of the aggregated ciphertext sensor data. The status of the 
individual bit fields of the ID-slot indicates whether the security key of the SN was used during 
aggregation wherein 1 indicates that the security key for the particular SN was used and 0 
indicates that the security key of the particular SN was not used. This phase continues 
periodically as the SNs continue to transmit encrypted data to the CH node, the CH node 
performs data aggregation and ID-slot updating followed by data transmission to the RMS and 
decryption at the RMS. An example implementation of the SCMT scheme in WSNs will shed 
more information about the working of the proposed scheme. Let us consider that the above 
mentioned initialization phases are complete and that the CH node has successfully generated an 
ID-slot for 64 SNs within the cluster measuring ambient temperature and that the RMS has 
successfully generated the Key-ID table for the 64 SNs. During a given dissemination interval 
of 2 seconds for sensor data and 2.5 seconds for aggregated sensor data, for the sake of 
simplicity with respect to this example let us assume that 3 sensor nodes which correspond to 
the 16th, 29th and 50th bit in the ID-slot are responsible for the generation of the aggregated 
ciphertext data, C as shown in Eq. 2 to Eq.4. 
   (Eq. 2) 
 
(Eq. 3) 
 (Eq. 4) 
First, the ID-slot is generated at the CH node wherein the corresponding states of the bit fields 
of the ID-slot (16, 29 and 50) are updated to 1. After the ciphertext C is generated, the ID-slot 
information is appended to the ciphertext data and transmitted to the GW node along with the 
auxiliary security header which contains information about the type of sensor data and frame 
counter used to counter replay attacks.  The data packet is transmitted from the CH node to the 
RMS via the gateway node which is connected to the backbone network. The RMS receives the 
ID-slot for the aggregated ciphertext of temperature data and processes the ID-slot (starting 
from the LSB) in order to determine the SN IDs responsible for the aggregated ciphertext data 
(16, 29 and 50) as shown in Fig. 5. The security keys (k16, k29 and k50) for the corresponding SN 
IDs are retrieved from the Key-ID table generated prior to data transmission and the key sum K 
is generated in order to decrypt the aggregated ciphertext data C to retrieve the aggregated 
plaintext summation of temperature sensor data maggr at the RMS. 
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Figure 5. Theoretical Implementation of the Proposed Scheme 
5. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION OF THE SCMT SCHEME 
5.1. Preliminary Simulation Parameters 
For the successful operation of the CMT and SCMT scheme and data aggregation within the 
WSN it is important that the network components agree upon certain parameters which include 
the following; a large integer M, the maximum sensor value Vmax and the maximum number of 
sensor nodes n, which satisfy the condition . This is mainly done in order 
to avoid incorrect decryptions when multiple ciphertext sensor data are aggregated. Due to the 
resource constraint nature of the WSNs the size of the ciphertext values are generally kept short 
ranging from 8 to 20 Bytes in length. This corresponds to an approximate integer value of 
1.8447*1019 – 1.4615*1048 for the large integer parameter M used for encryption and 
decryption. The value of M is distributed to all SNs and CH nodes during the key-distribution 
phase which is beyond the scope of this paper. The analysis was carried out for a selection 
of as the value of M, which corresponds to a ciphertext size of 8 Bytes in length as 
this suffices for the range of applications being targeted and also proves to be lightweight for 
the sensor nodes in terms of processing and transmission. The value of M can be obtained by 
 where  is the size of the ciphertext 8 Bytes (64 bits). By increasing the 
value of M the encryption can be made stronger since the security key employed during 
encryption will belong to a larger set ; thereby decreasing the probability of 
determining the security key by brute force methods. 
5.2. Packet Structures 
The WSN standard adopted in the numerical analysis to evaluate the performance of the SCMT 
scheme is the 6LoWPAN standard which implements IPv6 over sensor network data. For the 
purpose of the proposed SCMT scheme an extension needs to be added to the current 
6LoWPAN packet format as shown in Figure 6 for SNs and CH nodes. The IEEE 802.15.4 
header is introduced in the MAC layer followed by the 6LoWPAN header introduced in the 
network layer followed by the auxiliary security header introduced at the network layer and 
lastly followed by the ciphertext data. The auxiliary header for the SNs mainly contains 
information pertaining to the type of secure data transmitted (temperature, humidity, pressure, 
etc.) and a frame counter for countering replay attacks. The auxiliary header for the CH nodes 
consists of the data type field and frame counter field along with the ID-slot which is generated 
during data aggregation at the CH node during data transmission of the aggregated ciphertext 
data towards to the RMS. It is seen from the figure that the allowable data payload field is 
shown thereby setting a maximum payload length (around 102 Bytes for 16-bit addressing) in 
order to incorporate the auxiliary header, extended frame control and ID information. The 
unencrypted information enables the intermediate nodes such as the CH node to determine what 
security operations need to be carried out on the data packet. 
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Figure 6. General packet structure of the sensor node and the cluster head node data packet 
5.3. Theoretical Analysis 
5.3.1. Overhead Analysis 
The analysis carried out in this section mainly determines the packet overhead of the original 
CMT scheme as the number of sensor nodes are increased compared to the proposed SCMT 
scheme. The overall encrypted packet size which includes the auxiliary header and the 
ciphertext is also compared for the two schemes. It is evident from the graph in Fig. 7 that the 
packet overhead and the overall packet size increases linearly along with the increase in the 
number of sensor nodes participating in the data aggregation process. It is seen that the gradient 
for the overhead size in the original CMT scheme is much higher compared to the gradient of 
the proposed scheme. For the increase of every 100 SNs in the original CMT scheme the 
overhead increases by 200 Bytes which proves to be very expensive for SNs. However, the 
proposed SCMT scheme shows significant efficiency in terms of overhead wherein for every 
100 SNs the overhead is increased by just over 13 Bytes which proves to be 93.5% more 
efficient than the original CMT scheme, thus proving to be highly scalable and bandwidth 
efficient for WSNs. Also, it can be seen from Fig. 7 that the proposed SCMT scheme seems to 
accommodate more number of SNs within the cluster for a single data transmission (below 
dotted line labelled 1 in Fig. 7) from the CH node whereas for the original CMT scheme the 
number of transmissions from the CH node increases with the increase in the number of SNs 
within the cluster. It is seen that for every 50 to 60 SNs the number of transmissions from the 
CH node increases by 1 thereby consuming more energy for the transmission of the aggregated 
ciphertext data along with the consumption of more bandwidth. 
 
Figure 7. Comparative analysis of the induced packet overhead and total packet size transmitted 
from the CH node for the original CMT and proposed SCMT schemes 
The authors of [17] proposed a solution to counter the ID-issue wherein the IDs of only 
responding or non-responding nodes (whichever is lesser) are transmitted along with the 
aggregated ciphertext data. This proved to reduce the overheads by 1/5th which is a significant 
decrease compared to the original CMT scheme. In this analysis the proposed SCMT scheme is 
compared with the solution proposed in [17] in order to prove that the SCMT scheme is still 
significantly more efficient for large number of SNs. From Fig. 8 it is seen that for varying node 
transmission percentages from 10% to 50% the overhead of the original CMT scheme proves to 
be slightly lower in some cases compared to the proposed scheme. 
 
Figure 8. Comparison of overhead size of the original CMT scheme for different percentage 
ratios with the proposed SCMT scheme 
The node transmission percentage in this case can be defined as the percentage of responding or 
non-responding to the total number of sensor nodes within the cluster. For instance, when the 
percentage is 10% it may mean that 90% of the sensor nodes are responding and 10% are non-
responding or vice-versa. In this case it is more efficient to transmit the IDs of the 10% SNs 
(responding/non-responding) rather than all the SN IDs. From Fig. 8 the overhead of the hybrid 
scheme [17] proves to be 75.75% more efficient for a minimum of 10 SNs at node transmission 
percentage of 10% and 1.37% more efficient for a maximum of 90 SNs at node transmission 
percentage of 10%. Similarly, for a maximum node transmission percentage of 40% the original 
CMT schemes proves to be only 3.03% more efficient for a maximum of 10 SNs compared to 
the proposed SCMT scheme. For the node transmission percentage of 50% the original CMT 
scheme proves to be 17.5% less efficient compared to the SCMT scheme for a minimum of 10 
SNs under a single CH node. It is evident from Fig. 8 that as the node transmission percentage 
increases the hybrid scheme [17] proves to be less efficient compared to the proposed SCMT 
scheme for increasing number of SNs under a single CH node. Despite the original CMT 
scheme being more efficient compared to the SCMT scheme in some cases, it is unlikely that 
there would be a low node transmission percentage of SNs. Even if the node transmission 
percentage is low and the number of SNs increase then the hybrid scheme starts to deteriorate in 
terms of efficiency, thus limiting the number of SNs and not being scalable. Lastly, it is evident 
from Figure 8 that the proposed SCMT scheme is independent of the node transmission 
percentage since the ID-slots are formulated according to the total number of successfully 
registered SNs within the cluster and not based on the responding/non-responding SNs within 
the cluster. 
5.3.2. Numerical Analysis of Energy Consumption at the CH Node 
The energy analysis is only carried out for the energy consumption of the cluster head node 
which implements the slotting scheme. For the original CMT scheme, it is the cluster head node 
which is mainly affected in terms of energy consumption with the increase in the number of 
SNs due to the ID-issue which increases the packet overhead and hence the energy required for 
transmission of multiple data packets. The RMS is considered as a powerful device and hence 
the energy consumption analysis is not carried out for the RMS node. The main processes which 
consume energy at the CH node are the header decryptions/encryptions; data aggregation; 
slotting mechanism; data reception/transmissions; and the sleep period of the CH node. For the 
analysis a cluster head node dissemination interval of 5 seconds is considered wherein the CH 
node remains in the active state (rate) for 1% of the total dissemination period thereby leaving 
the CH node for a 99% sleep period. The energy model for the CH node is derived from [19] 
and the following current and energy consumption for the sky tmote sensor [20] is as shown in 
Table 2. The operating voltage of the CH node is 3V and the total energy consumption of the 
CH node during the 5s dissemination period is given in Eq. 5 wherein ERX, N is the energy 
consumed for the reception of the encrypted sensor data packets from N sensor nodes; EDEC is 
the energy consumed for the decryption of the encrypted header of the sensor data packet; EAggr, 
N is the energy consumed for the aggregation of the data from N sensor nodes; Eslot is the energy 
consumed for the generation of the slots; EENC is the energy consumed for the encryption of the 
header of the CH node data packet; ETX is the energy consumed to transmit the single CH node 
data packet; and Esleep is the energy consumed during the sleep period of the CH node. From the 
study of energy consumption for WSNs in [19] it is seen that for simple data aggregation 
functions the energy consumed is 5 nJ/bit and the energy consumed for the processing 
(encryption, decryption and slot generation) is 7 nJ/bit. The total energy is calculated using the 
energy model for the CH nodes, as given in Eq. 1, for varying number of SNs within the cluster 
for the CH dissemination interval of 5 seconds is shown in Fig. 9 which compares the original 
CMT scheme with the proposed SCMT scheme. Fig. 10 on the other hand compares the energy 
consumption between the scheme proposed in [17] and the SCMT scheme for different node 
transmission percentages for both the schemes. It is evident from Fig. 9 that as the number of 
SNs increase within a cluster the energy consumption of the CH node increases and that the 
proposed SCMT scheme proves to be 11.86% for a maximum of 250 SNs. This is mainly due to 
the reduced packet overhead introduced by the slotting scheme and the reduced number of 
transmissions. 
 (Eq.5) 
Table 2: Energy parameters used for the implementation of the SCMT energy model 
Parameter Current Time Energy 
ERX 21.8 mA (1.248 x N) ms (81.62 x N) µJ 
ETX 19.5 mA (1.248 + 0.004N) ms (73 + 0.234N) µJ 
Esleep 2.6 µA 4.95 s 12.87 µJ 
Parameter Data Size  
EDEC (152 x N) bits (0.76 x N) µJ 
Eslot N bits (0.007 x N) µJ 
EAggr (64 x N) bits (0.32 x N) µJ 
EENC (152 + N) bits (0.76 + 0.007N) µJ 
 
Figure 9. Comparative analysis of energy consumption between the original CMT and the 
proposed SCMT schemes 
From Fig. 10 it is evident that as the node transmission percentage increases the energy 
consumption of the original CMT scheme increases compared to the proposed SCMT scheme; 
thus proving that SCMT scheme is 11.57% more energy efficient compared to the CMT scheme 
for a maximum of 250 SNs at the node transmission percentage of 50%. A possible drawback of 
the proposed SCMT scheme could be the initial setup phases as mentioned above since the 
increase in the number of SNs within the cluster increases the number of transmissions from the 
CH node during the setup phase wherein the IDs of the participating SNs within the cluster are 
transmitted within the time interval Treg. The total energy consumption of the proposed SCMT 
scheme at the CH node during the setup phase includes broadcasting of the join_request, 
reception of the individual join_responses, transmission of the ID_info and reception of the 
ID_response. The energy consumption by the CH node for a maximum of 250 SNs was 
calculated at 24.65 mJ; however this is only the one-time energy consumption during the setup 
phase. 
 5.3.3. Number of Transmissions during the Setup Phase 
Fig. 11 shows the number of transmissions during the setup stage against varying number of 
SNs within the cluster. It is seen that with the increase in the number of sensor nodes, the 
number of transmissions from the CH node increases. This is because the SN IDs have to be 
appended to the ID_info and transmitted to the GW node using the IEEE 802.15.4 MAC frame 
of 127 Bytes. However, it is important to note that the setup phase is a one-time and the energy 
costs of the setup phase can be considered to be acceptable as it helps saves energy in the 
subsequent data transmission phase. 
 
Figure 11. Number of transmissions from individual network entities during setup phase of the 
proposed scheme 
 
 
6. FUTURE WORK AND CONCLUSION 
The proposed SCMT scheme mainly addresses the ID-issue of the CMT algorithm presented in 
[12]. However, in order to increases the security level we propose to integrate the proposed 
SCMT scheme with probabilistic homomorphic encryption schemes which introduces some sort 
of randomness in order to increase the security level. Nevertheless, most symmetric 
homomorphic encryption schemes transmit the IDs of responding/non-responding sensor nodes 
which increase the overhead and energy consumption for data transmission thus making the 
implementation of security expensive in WSNs. Firstly, it is seen that the proposed SCMT 
scheme is 17.537% lighter in terms of the induced overhead compared to the original CMT 
scheme for a minimum percentage rate of transmission of 10% and a maximum of 250 SNs. 
Secondly, it is seen that the proposed SCMT scheme is 14.21% more energy efficient for a 
maximum of 250 SNs compared to the original CMT scheme at 10% percentage rate of 
transmission which is a significant conservation of valuable sensor node energy which can 
further increase the lifetime of the WSN. Lastly, it is seen that the proposed SCMT scheme is 
highly scalable since the increase in the number of sensor nodes within the cluster does not 
significantly increase the energy consumption or size of the ciphertext sensor data unlike the 
original CMT scheme. 
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